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A Dreadful Prognosis: Patentability of
Diagnostic and Personalized Medical
Procedures in the Wake of In re Bilski
by MATTHEW D. SHOW, PH.D.*
"If nature has made any one thing less susceptible than all others
of exclusive property, it is the action of the thinking power called an
idea . ... " -Thomas Jefferson'
I. Introduction
The Constitution grants Congress sweeping authority to define
patentable subject matter. However, the section of the modern
Patent Act describing precisely what qualifies as a patentable
invention is essentially identical to the language penned by Thomas
Jefferson when he wrote the first Patent Act at the end of the 18h
Century. Given the incredible advances in science, medicine, and
engineering over the last two and a quarter centuries, the fact that
most inventions still fall into what Jefferson considered "patentable
subject matter" is a testament to his vision and foresight. However,
over the past few decades, patent applicants in certain technological
fields are discovering a conflict inherent between the nature of their
claimed inventions and judicial interpretation of Jefferson's Patent
Act language throughout the 19h and 201h Centuries.
This conflict is particularly apparent in the fields of diagnostic
and personalized medicine. Diagnostics is an ancient branch of
medicine focusing on the identification of a disease or other abnormal
condition from the symptoms a patient presents to a diagnostician.
By recognizing the basic biochemical and physiological signs of a
* J.D. Candidate, 2010, University of California, Hastings College of the Law, San
Francisco, Calif.; B.S., Molecular Biology and Psychology, 2000, Grove City College,
Grove City, Penn.; Ph.D., Biochemistry and Molecular Biology, 2005, The Johns Hopkins
University, Baltimore, Maryland.
1. VI THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, at 180-81 (Henry A. Washington ed.,
1871).
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pathological state, a physician is able to determine what course of
treatment is required to return the patient to health. Personalized
medicine, on the other hand, is a much newer concept. Essentially, it
is the application of information gleaned from the Human Genome
Project and other large-scale genetic studies of inherited disease to
individuals susceptible to these conditions due to inheritance or
mutations in their DNA. The goal of personalized medicine is to use
an individual's unique genetic "code" to predict what medical
conditions that person may be susceptible to during their life and to
determine what form of treatment will best alleviate or even prevent
manifestation of that medical condition.
This Note will review the development and the interpretation of
the patentable subject matter section of the Patent Act, 35 U.S.C. §
101, as applied to diagnostic and personalized medicine method
patents from the time of Jefferson to the present day. Modern
Supreme Court precedent concerning what exactly qualifies as a
patentable method claim will be discussed as well as how a business
method case, Bilski v. Kappos, threatens to make these types of
methods unpatentable. Additionally, the results of an analysis
demonstrating how patent agents and attorneys currently draft these
types of claims will be presented along with information as to how to
alter these claims to conform to the en banc Federal Circuit's decision
in Bilski. Finally, this Note will argue these types of method claims
are not only deserving of patentability, they are a vital part of the
American economy and are critical for the maintenance and
improvement of public health.
II. Background: The Contentious History of Medical and
Diagnostic Method Patents
A. A Brief Overview of United States Patent Law
The Constitution delegates to Congress the authority "[t]o
promote the progress of science and useful arts, by securing for
limited times to . .. inventors the exclusive right to their ...
discoveries.2 Congress implements this authority in Title 35 of the
United States Code, which details the broad requirements for
obtaining a United States patent.' At the heart of the patent system is
a fundamental quid pro quo between the inventor and society: the
2. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
3. 35 U.S.C. (2006).
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inventor agrees to disclose the details of her invention to the public in
exchange for a temporally-limited "right to exclude others from
making, using, offering for sale or selling the invention throughout
the United States or importing the invention into the United
States .... "4 The means of this disclosure is through the filing and
successful prosecution of a patent application with the U.S. Patent
and Trademark Office (PTO).
In order to be patentable, an invention must pass several hurdles
during the application and prosecution process. A patent applicant
must satisfy a PTO Examiner that the subject matter of the invention
described in the application is both novel6 and nonobvious.' These
requirements ensure the monopoly granted to the inventor is not
already available to the public nor is obvious to one of ordinary skill
in the relevant art given what is known in that art at the time of the
alleged discovery. As a result, the novelty and obviousness
requirements prevent ideas already in the public domain from
becoming inaccessible by the granting of a patent.
Additionally, an applicant must fully describe his invention such
that one having ordinary skill in the art to which the invention
pertains can make and use the invention.! This includes revealing to
the public the best mode of utilizing the invention so that once the
patent expires, the public may fully employ it for their benefit.9 The
patent application concludes with a number of claims, which must
distinctly point out and describe exactly what the inventor is claiming
as her invention.") This serves the duel function of informing the PTO
of the metes and bounds of the patent applicant's claimed property
right as well as putting the public on notice as to the existence of the
claimed invention.
Not all discoveries are patentable. Usually, the first consider-
ation during prosecution is whether the invention described in the
application falls within one of four classifications Congress deems
4. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1) (2006).
5. Prosecution of patent applications is governed by 37 C.F.R. (2007) while PTO
rules controlling examination of applications are found in the Manual of Patent Examining
Procedure (MPEP), U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, Manual of Patent Examining
Procedure (8th ed. 2001, rev. Jul. 2008).
6. 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2006).
7. Id. § 103 (2006).
8. Id. § 112, 1 (2006).
9. Id.
10. Id. § 112, 2 (2006).
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appropriate subject matter for a patent. The Supreme Court has
interpreted this section of the patent code very broadly, going as far
as declaring that patentable subject matter extends to "anything
under the sun made by man." 2 As detailed, infra, this section of the
patent code has remained extraordinarily stable for more than two
centuries despite the rapid changes occurring in the fields of science
and engineering during the Industrial Revolution and the later
advances of the Computer and Space Ages.
B. The Genesis of 'Patentable Subject Matter' in 35 U.S.C. §101
At first glance, it may seem odd that Thomas Jefferson would
come to author the first United States Patent Act. To Jefferson, a
leading intellectual of the Enlightenment and a prominent inventor
himself, the proposition that the fruit of man's inventive genius could
somehow be "owned" suggested a heresy to a natural order
"peculiarly and benevolently designed by nature." 4 Nevertheless,
taking his lead from the English Statute of Monopolies, Jefferson
wrote the Patent Act of 1790 sanctioning patents for "any useful art,
manufacture, engine, machine, or device, or any improvement
therein"" to encourage "men to pursue ideas which may produce
utility."' Congress amended the Act in 1793 to permit the patenting
of "any art, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any
new and useful improvement [thereof]"" and again in 1952 when the
word "art" was changed to "process."" Remarkably, aside from these
minor changes, the patentable subject matter section of the modern
Patent Act, Title 35, § 101 of the United States Code, remains
identical to the words Jefferson penned over two centuries ago. The
subject matter of all patents issued in the United States must be
capable of classification as a "process, machine, manufacture, or
composition of matter." 20
11. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006).
12. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980).
13. Act of Apr. 10, 1790, ch. 7, § 1, 1 Stat. 109.
14. THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 2 at 180-81.
15. English Statute of Monopolies, 1623, 21 Jac. 1, c. 3, § 6.
16. Act of Apr. 10, 1790, ch. 7, § 1, 1 Stat. 109.
17. THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 2 at 180-81.
18. Act of Feb. 21, 1793, ch. 11, § 1, 1 Stat. 318.
19. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006).
20. Id.
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Medical and biological knowledge in the late 18th Century was
still medieval by today's standards. Diagnoses of maladies based on
the ancient beliefs of "humors" and other superstitions were
common. 2' The practice of "bleeding" those suffering from diseases
with leeches to restore "balance" to the humors was particularly in
vogue during Jefferson's time.22 Surgery was primitive, with the
concepts of sterilization, anesthetic, and even basic knowledge of
human anatomy decades to a century away. Jefferson was well
acquainted with the limitations of medical science, having mourned
the deaths of four infant children and his young wife following years
of illness, in spite of the availability of the best doctors in colonial
America at the time. With this backdrop in mind and English
precedent to guide him, Jefferson chose the subject matter that would
qualify as patentable under the United States' new system.
Therefore, it is of little wonder that this regime was initially hesitant
to permit patent grants claiming medical, surgical, and diagnostic
methods.
C. Early case law held scientific principles as well as medical and
surgical methods were not patentable subject matter
From the beginning, both the Patent Office as well as the courts
refused to extend patentable subject matter to include discoveries of
scientific principles. Specifically, the Supreme Court has held:
"[L]aws of nature, physical phenomena, and abstract ideas [are]
not patentable. Thus, a new mineral discovered in the earth or
a new plant found in the wild is not patentable subject matter.
Likewise, Einstein could not patent his celebrated law that E =
mc 2; nor could Newton have patented the law of gravity. Such
discoveries are "manifestations of ... nature, free to all men
and reserved exclusively to none."25
Perhaps the most famous instance of an inventor attempting to
capture a scientific principle occurred in the so-called "Telegraph
21. David Keirsey, PLEASE UNDERSTAND ME II: TEMPERAMENT, CHARACTER,
INTELLIGENCE 23 (Prometheus Nemesis 1998).
22. Gilbert Seigworth, Bloodletting Over the Centuries, 80 N.Y. ST. J. MEDICINE 2022
(1980).
23. Biography of Martha Wayles Skelton Jefferson, http://www.whitehouse.gov/
about/firstladies/marthajefferson/ (last visited Oct. 12, 2009).
24. 1 Donald S. Chisum, Chisum on Patents § 1.03[2] (2003).
25. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980) (citing Funk Bros. Seed Co. v.
Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130 (1948))(internal citation omitted).
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Case," where the Supreme Court invalidated a claim in Samuel
Morse's patent for the telegraph. 6 Morse's eighth claim incorporated
all uses of the principle of electromagnetism for the communication
of written characters over distances.27 The Court noted that "some
future inventor, in the onward march of science, may discover a mode
of writing or printing at a distance by means of the electric or galvanic
current, without using any part of the process or combination set
forth in the plaintiff's specification" and therefore require Morse's
permission for its use.28 Thus, the Court found the claim would
preempt any and all use of the natural phenomenon of
electromagnetism for the conveyance of messages and was therefore
invalid for claiming unpatentable subject matter.
Similarly, in one of the first cases to examine the patentability of
a medical procedure, the New York Circuit Court ruled doctors who
discovered that inhalation of ether would render a patient
unconscious prior to surgery could not patent a method employing
that innovation. While the opinion in Morton v. New York Eye
Infirmary characterized the inventors as having made one of the
"great discoveries of modern times,"" the Court nevertheless cast
doubt on the patentability of medical procedures in general. The
court noted that a "discovery may be brilliant and useful, and not
patentable. No matter through what long, solitary vigils ... the secret
may have been wrung from the bosom of Nature ... Something more
is necessary." 32 The Court went on to remark that "[n]either the
natural functions of an animal upon which or through which [a
combination] may be designed to operate, nor any of the useful
purposes to which it may be applied" could form parts of the patented
combination. The natural process of inhaling a gas, even if the result
26. O'Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. 62 (1854).
27. Id. at 112; Morse's eighth claim: "I do not propose to limit myself to the specific
machinery described in the foregoing specification and claims; the essence of my invention
being the use of the motive power of the electric or galvanic current, which I call electro-
magnetism, however developed for marking or printing intelligible characters, signs, or
letter, at any distances, being a new application of that power of which I claim to be the
first inventor or discoverer."
28. Id. at 113.
29. Id.
30. Morton v. N.Y. Eye Infirmary, 17 F. Cas. 879 (S.D.N.Y. 1862) (No. 9865).
31. Id. at 883.
32. Id. at 884.
33. Id. (emphasis added).
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of that process brought about a revolution in surgery and medicine,
did not qualify for the protection of a patent grant.
Following Morton, courts and the Patent Office used the
language of its holding to prevent the patenting of medical methods
for treating the human body in general.34 In Ex parte Brinkerhoff,
the Patent Office relied on Morton to conclude the applicant's
method of using medical instruments to treat hemorrhoids was not
patentable subject matter. In formulating an almost per se rule, the
Commissioner of Patents declared "methods or modes of treatment
of physicians of certain diseases are not patentable."" However, as
medical science and technology slowly advanced, later decisions by
U.S. District Courts and the Patent Office Board of Appeals began to
back away from this ostensibly automatic rule. For example, in Dick
v. Lederle Antitoxin Laboratories, a district court determined a skin
test for revealing the vulnerability of a person to Scarlatina was
patentable subject matter.
Eventually, seventy-one years after the fact, the Patent Office
Board of Appeals overruled Ex parte Brinkerhoff s prohibition
against the patenting of all medical method patents.3 ' This decision
opened the door for the relatively recent phenomenon of patents
directed to methods of practicing surgical, diagnostic, and
personalized medicine. The reason why the law developed in this
manner is unclear. It is certainly plausible that by the middle of the
2 0 1h Century, medical science had advanced so far from the time of
Jefferson that methods directed to the treatment of disease were
reliable and consistently reproducible. Advances in basic science, the
development of vaccines for common diseases, the discoveries of
antibiotics and the principles of the genetic basis of inheritance
certainly supports this notion. Alternatively, seeing the incredible
progress of medical science, the PTO and the courts may have
determined it was in the public interest to have the patent system
incentivize the development of even greater medical advances.
34. 1-1 Donald S. Chisum, Chisum on Patents § 1.03[3] (2010).
35. Methods or Modes of Treatment of Diseases--Held Unpatentable, Ex parte
Brinkerhoff, 27 J. Pat. Off. Soc'y 797 (1945).
36. Id. at 798.
37. Chisum, supra note 35, §1.03[3]; Ex parte Kettering 35 U.S.P.Q. 342 (Pat. Off.
Bd. App. 1936); Ex parte Wappler, 26 U.S.P.Q. 191 (Pat. Off. Bd. App. 1934); see also
Becton-Dickinson v. Scherer, 106 F. Supp. 665 (E.D. Mich. 1952), aff'd, 211 F.2d 835 (6th
Cir. 1954); Ellis v. Coe, 49 U.S.P.Q. 232 (D. D.C. 1941).
38. Dick v. Lederle Antitoxin Labs., 43 F.2d 628 (S.D. N.Y. 1930).
39. Ex parte Scherer, 103 U.S.P.Q. 107 (Pat. Off. Bd. App. 1954).
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Whatever the reason, as science advanced, patent applicants, the
PTO, and the courts again faced the ghosts of Morse, Morton, and
Brinkerhoff as they attempted to fit claims to the seemingly natural
principles of diagnostic and personalized medicine into the language
of 35 U.S.C. §101. The problem of how diagnostic methods fit into
the traditional categories of patentable subject matter would come to
a head in 2006. The results would be satisfying to very few.
D. Laboratory Corp. v. Metabolite: The Supreme Court Decides It
Would Be A Good Idea To Not Decide
Lab. Corp. concerned the validity of a patent claiming a method
for the diagnosis of certain diseases caused by dietary deficiencies of
vitamin B12 and folate.4 () Humans need these vitamins to ensure the
proper synthesis of amino acids, which are the building blocks of
proteins, as well as for the production of the nucleic acids DNA and
RNA.4' Vitamin B12 and folate deficiencies are associated with
improper DNA methylation and subsequent impaired DNA
biosynthesis, pernicious anemia, increased risks for cardiovascular
disease and adverse pregnancy outcomes, as well as neural tube
defects such as spina bifida.42 The inventors, who assigned the patent
to a company that eventually granted a license to Metabolite,
discovered that people suffering from medical conditions associated
with B12 and folate deficiencies have high levels of a certain amino
acid, homocysteine, present within their blood serum.4 Careful
measurement of the relative concentration of this factor when
compared to normal serum homocyteine levels could diagnosis the
presence of a B12 or folate deficiency in patients suffering from
diseases associated with this condition.44
Metabolite sued LabCorp., a former licensee, for inducing others
to infringe its patent when LabCorp. began using another company's
test for determining serum levels of homocysteine.45 Rather than
assert LabCorp.'s use of the rival company's test infringed the
patent's claims for measuring homocysteine in serum, Metabolite
40. U.S. Patent No. 4,940,658 (filed Nov. 20, 1986).
41. Donald & Judith Voet, Biochemistry 675 (2d ed. 1995).
42. G. Moreiras et al., Cobalamin, Folic Acid, and Homocysteine, 67 Suppl 1. Nutr
Rev. S69 (2009).
43. Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., Inc., 548 U.S. 124, 128 (2006)
(Breyer, J., dissenting).
44. Id.
45. Id. at 129 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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chose to assert the much broader claim 13,46 arguing it "created a
protected monopoly over the process of 'correlating' test results and
potential vitamin deficiencies." 47 At trial, a jury agreed with
Metabolite and found LabCorp. induced others to infringe this very
broadly construed claim.48  Essentially, by providing test results of
serum homocysteine levels to doctors, LabCorp. induced the doctors
who ordered those tests to infringe claim 13 simply through the act of
examining the test results and correlating those results with the
presence or absence of a B12 or folate deficiency.49 On appeal, the
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed the jury decision,
rejecting LabCorp.'s contention that if Metabolite's claim 13 was as
broad as construed by the district court, then it was invalid for
"indefiniteness, lack of written description, non-enablement,
anticipation, and obviousness."
The Supreme Court granted LabCorp.'s petition for certiorari on
October 31, 2005. Of the three questions LabCorp. submitted for
review, the only one the Court chose to address was:
"[w]hether a method patent setting forth an indefinite,
undescribed, and non-enabling step directing a party simply to
"correlate" test results can validly claim a monopoly over a
basic scientific relationship used in medical treatment such that
any doctor necessarily infringes the patent merely by thinking
about the relationship after looking at a test result?"-3
This was a poorly written question from the perspective of patent
law since it not only fails specifically to mention 35 U.S.C. §101, it
also assumes its own answer. An "indefinite," "undescribed," and
"non-enabling" method is, by definition, invalid under 35 U.S.C. §
46. U.S. Patent No. 4,940,658; Claim 13: "A method for detecting a deficiency of
cobalamin or folate in warm-blooded animals comprising the steps of: "assaying a body
fluid for an elevated level of total homocysteine; and correlating an elevated level of total
homocysteine in said body fluid with a deficiency of cobalamin or folate."
47. Lab. Corp., 548 U.S. at 129.
48. Id. at 130.
49. Id.
50. Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., Inc., 370 F.3d 1354 (Fed. Cir.
2004).
51. Lab. Corp., 548 U.S. at 130-31 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
52. Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., Inc., 546 U.S. 975, 975 (2005)
(per curium).
53. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, Lab. Corp. of Am. v. Metabolite Labs., Inc., No.
04-607, 2004 WL 2505526, at *1 (U.S. filed Nov. 3, 2004).
10 - SHow -A DREADFUL PROGNOSIS - 051310 AM.DOC (Do NOT DELEIE) 5/14/2010 9:41:16 AM
310 HASTINGS SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 2:2
112.54 The case drew a large amount of attention from interested
parties and industry groups who subsequently filed a considerable
number of amicus briefs with the court. 55 Additionally, the Solicitor
General of the United States submitted two briefs and participated in
the oral arguments held on March 21, 2006. *6
On June 26, 2006, without further comment and without the then
newly-installed Chief Justice Roberts participating, the Court
dismissed the writ of certiorari in the Lab. Corp. case as
improvidently granted. Justice Breyer, joined by Justices Souter and
Stevens dissented from the decision to dismiss.' Ostensibly, the
reason for the dismissal lay in the fact that LabCorp. had not referred
to patentable subject matter and 35 U.S.C. § 101 in either the district
court proceedings nor in their arguments before the Federal Circuit
regarding the invalidity of Metabolite's patent.! However, Justice
Breyer, in his dissent, as well as many commentators regarded this
rationale as tenuous, especially in light of the fully developed record
on the matter before the Court provided by the multitude of amicus
briefs.'? In fact, the Court initially granted certiorari in spite of the
54. 1-1 Donald S. Chisum, Chisum on Patents § 1.03[2][e] (2010).
55. Amicus briefs filed in favor of LabCorp. included those from AARP, Affymetrix,
Inc. and Professor John H. Barton, American Clinical Laboratory Association, American
Heart Association, American Medical Association, the American College of Medical
Genetics, the American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, the Association for
Molecular Pathology, the Association of American Medical Colleges, and the College of
American Pathologists, Patients not Patents, Inc., People's Medical Society, Public Patent
Foundation; Amicus briefs filed in favor of Metabolite included those from American
Intellectual Property Law Association, Boston Patent Law Association, Federal Circuit
Bar Association, Franklin Pierce Law Center, Perlegen Sciences, Inc. and Mohr, Davidow
Ventures.
56. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v.
Metabolite Labs., Inc., No. 04-607, 2005 WL 3533248 (U.S. filed Dec. 23, 2005); Brief for
the United States as Amicus Curiae, Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., Inc.,
No. 04-607, 2005 WL 2072283 (U.S. filed Aug. 26, 2005).
57. Lab. Corp., 548 U.S. at 124 (per curium).
58. Lab. Corp., 548 U.S. at 125 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
59. Id. at 132.
60. Id. at 132-33 (Breyer, J., dissenting); see, e.g., Daniel T. Marvin, The Supreme
Court's Missed Opportunity to Settle the Handiwork of Nature Exception to Patentable
Subject Matter in Laboratory Corporation ofAmerica v. Metabolite Laboratories, 26 Temp.
J. Sci. Tech. & Envtl. L. 113, 139 (2007) ("The record was adequately developed for the
Court to render a decision on whether Claim 13 was patentable subject matter.") and John
G. New, Patently Wrong: The U.S. Supreme Court Punts in the Case of LabCorp v.
Metabolite, 10 Vand. J. Ent. & Tech. L. 147, 169 (2007) ("[U]nlike defenses mounted on
issues of fact, which cannot be raised on appeal if they are not pled in the trial court, the
validity of a patent based on the patentability of the subject matter under § 101 is a matter
of law and may be reviewed sua sponte by the Court."); see supra note 56.
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fact that in his initial brief on the matter, the Solicitor General
recommended against deciding the question. Due to the numerous
similar diagnostic patents already in existence, according to the
Solicitor General, deciding to "overturn [the] PTO's approach could
call into question a substantial number of patent claims and
undermine the settled expectations of numerous participants in
technology-based industries.""
On the merits, Justice Breyer strongly believed Metabolite's
claim 13 was invalid for lack of patentable subject matter under 35
U.S.C. § 101.62 Seeing "little doubt that the correlation between
homocysteine and vitamin deficiency set forth in claim 13 is a 'natural
phenomenon,"', 3 he drew a strong comparison between Metabolite's
claim 13 and Morse's claim 8 which had been invalidated by the Court
a century and a half earlier.64 Breyer greatly doubted whether the
claim language even fit the traditional definition of a patentable
"process," as claim 13 merely "instructs the user to (1) obtain test
results [by any means available] and (2) think about them."6 5 By
Justice Breyer's reckoning, a natural phenomenon does not suddenly
become patentable under 35 U.S.C. § 101 if it is simply put in
"process" form. That is, Einstein still could not patent the natural
relationship between E = Mc2 by instructing the user to (1) measure
the mass of something by any means available then multiply it by the
speed of light squared and (2) think about the product of those
numbers. Additionally, even assuming the claim language was, in
fact, a patentable process, the claim amounted to nothing more than a
simple correlation between serum homocysteine levels and the
presence or absence of a disease. Justice Breyer concluded that:
"[R]espondents have simply described the natural law at issue
in the abstract patent language of a "process." But they cannot
avoid the fact that the process is no more than an instruction to
read some numbers in light of medical knowledge .... [A]side
from the unpatented test, they embody only the correlation
between homocysteine and vitamin deficiency that the
researchers uncovered. In my view, that correlation is an
61. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v.
Metabolite Labs., Inc., No. 04-607, 2005 WL 3533248, at *14 (U.S. filed Dec. 23, 2005).
62. Lab. Corp., 548 U.S. at 135 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
63. Id.
64. Id. at 136-37; O'Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S at 112; supra note 28.
65. Lab. Corp., 548 U.S. at 136 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
66. Id. at 137 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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unpatentable "natural phenomenon," and I can find nothing in
claim 13 that adds anything more of significance.""
Thus, the Supreme Court decided not to decide whether medical
diagnostic methods were patentable. Rather, the Court let those
types of patents remain valid, due to the lower Federal Circuit
decision that did not even address the matter of patentable subject
matter. Simultaneously, the Court cast great doubt on the validity of
these types of patents due to Breyer's dissent that was joined by one
third of the Court. The next challenge to the patentability of medical
diagnostics would not come from a case where the controversy was on
point, but, rather, from the world of business method patents.
III. Judicial Interpretation of 35 U.S.C. §101 and the Uneasy
Relationship between the Patentability of Business Methods
and Diagnostic Medicine
A. The Mental Steps Doctrine and the Machine or Transformation
Test
While becoming increasingly muddled by vague Federal Circuit
and Supreme Court decisions throughout the years, the Mental Steps
Doctrine generally states that "no patent can be obtained [under 35
U.S.C. § 101] for a method an essential component of which consists
of human mental participation."' The modern version of the Mental
Steps Doctrine had its genesis in the Supreme Court's 1972 decision
in Gottschalk v. Benson." In Gottschalk, the Court determined a
method for converting numbers into binary numerals, which was
useful in the programming of computers, was not patentable subject
matter.7" The reasoning Justice Douglas used to arrive at that
conclusion, which Professor Chisum variously refers to as "illogical,"
"uncertain," "equivocal[]," and unable "to stand up under analysis,"
seems to make two points relevant to the patentability of medical
diagnostic and personalized medicine methods.7 First, "[a] method
which can be performed mentally or which is the equivalent of human
mental work is not patentable. Such methods are "basic tools"-
67. Lab. Corp., 548 U.S. at 137-38 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
68. 1 Donald S. Chisurn, Chisun on Patents § 1.03[6] (2003).
69. 409 U.S. 63 (1972).
70. Id. at 71.
71. 1 Donald S. Chisurn, Chisun on Patents § 1.03 [6][c] (2003).
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open to all."7 2  Second, "[a] method which does not directly and
physically alter or transform an article and which is not tied to the
operation of a particular machine is not patentable." In Lab. Corp.,
Breyer cited Gottschalk, to strengthen his argument that claim 13 was
not patentable subject matter because it was (1) simply the mental
process of measuring serum homocysteine and thinking about the
results74 and (2) not a method directed at the transformation of blood
or anything else.
Six years later, the Supreme Court extended the doctrine set
forth in Gottschalk when it decided, in a 6-3 decision, Parker v.
Flook.76 The patent at issue in Flook was for a method to update an
"alarm limit" by taking variables such as temperature and pressure
into consideration during catalytic conversion of hydrocarbons.7 If
one of the variables exceeded the mathematically calculated alarm
limit, the system produced a signal indicating this fact.7' The method
consisted of three steps: (1) A measurement of a given variable
followed by (2) a mathematical calculation to arrive at a new alarm
limit value ending with (3) adjustment of the limit to correspond to
that new value. In ruling the method unpatentable subject matter,
Justice Stevens held the fact that the mathematical algorithm of step
(2) is followed by the "post solution activity" of step (3) is not enough
to transform an unpatentable principle (the algorithm) into a
patentable method." Once stripped of the post-calculation
72. 1 Donald S. Chisum, Chisum on Patents § 1.03 [6][c] (2003).
73. Id.
74. Lab. Corp., 548 U.S. at 127 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
75. Id. at 136.
76. 437 U.S 584 (1978).
77. Id. at 585.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 596-97; Flook's claim 1:
" A method for updating the value of at least one alarm limit on at least one
process variable involved in a process comprising the catalytic chemical
conversion of hydrocarbons wherein said alarm limit has a current value of Bo+K
wherein Bo is the current alarm base and K is a predetermined alarm offset
which comprises: (1) Determining the present value of said process variable, said
present value being defined as PVL; (2) Determining a new alarm base BI, using
the following equation: B[1]=Bo(1.0<vl>minF)+PVL(F) where F is a
predetermined number greater than zero and less than 1.0; (3) Determining an
updated alarm limit which is defined as B1+GK; and thereafter (4) Adjusting
said alarm limit to said updated alarm limit value."
80. Id. at 590.
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adjustment in step (3), the claimed method consists of nothing but the
measurement of a variable followed by plugging that variable into an
unpatentable mathematical formula. In Lab. Corp, Stevens joined
Breyer's dissent in comparing the diagnostic correlation at issue in
that case with the rejected algorithm in Flook, determining that the
subject matter at issue in both cases involved an unpatentable "simple
natural correlation, i.e. a 'natural phenomenon."'
In Part III of the "Patent Eligibility Trilogy", the Court reversed
course a bit in Diamond v. Diehr when, in a 5-4 decision authored by
Justice Rehnquist, they determined a method for curing rubber
incorporating an algorithm and a computer was patentable under 35
U.S.C. § 10.2 The method at issue in Diehr comprised (1) measuring
the temperature in the rubber mold (2) calculation of the time
required to cure the rubber via a specific mathematical equation, and
(3) opening the rubber press when the calculated curing time passed."
The majority opinion carefully distinguished Gottschalk and Flook,
which Rehnquist characterized as an attempt to patent a
mathematical formula that produced binary code in the case of the
former and a numerical alarm limit in the latter.84 Rather than
attempting to preempt the use of algorithms as in Gottschalk and
Flook, Diehr's claimed method:
"[d]escribe[s] in detail a step-by-step method for [transforming
raw, uncured synthetic rubber into a different state or thing]
with the loading of a mold with ... uncured rubber and ending
with the eventual opening of the press at the conclusion of the
cure. Industrial processes such as this are the type which have
historically been eligible to receive the protection of our patent
laws.""
Consequently, under the reasoning of Diehr, the fact that a
method claim incorporates a mathematical algorithm is not fatal to
patentability as long as it is applied to a process that transforms a
thing to a different state of being or requires some kind of a machine
to carry out. This principle became the "Machine or Transformation
Test." Justice Stevens vigorously dissented, arguing that the majority
81. Lab. Corp., 548 U.S. at 137 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
82. 450 U.S. 175 (1981).
83. Id. at 179.
84. Id. at 185-86.
85. Id. at 184.
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misinterpreted his earlier opinion in Flook" and contended Diehr's
third step was the same type of "post solution activity" that failed to
make Flook's method patentable subject matter.
The Federal Circuit struggled for years to apply the principles of
Gottschalk, Flook, and Diehr in cases involving claims to software and
business methods. State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature
Financial Group involved "a data processing system ... for
implementing an investment structure which was developed for use
in ... business as an administrator and accounting agent for mutual
funds.""' The patent claimed a business method for pooling the assets
of mutual funds into an investment portfolio organized as a
partnership." In an opinion by Judge Rich, a Federal Circuit panel
reversed a district court ruling finding the patent did not fall into a
class of patentable subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101." While
recalling the prohibition against patenting disembodied abstract
mathematical algorithms as stated by the Supreme Court in
Gottschalk, Flook, and Diehr," the panel held prior Federal Circuit
precedent permitted the patenting of algorithms applied in useful
ways to method claims. 2 The court determined the data processing
system was patentable because "the transformation of data ... by a
machine through a series of mathematical calculations .. . constitutes
a practical application of a mathematical algorithm . .. because it
produces 'a useful, concrete and tangible result.""' This revelation,
that an abstract or scientific principle only need be applied usefully
under 35 U.S.C. § 101, was used by Metabolite in Lab. Corp. to argue
that the diagnostic was patentable subject matter as it produced a
useful, concrete, and tangible result: detection of B12 or folate
deficiency.94 However, Justice Breyer dismissed this argument in his
dissent, remarking that while State Street "does say that a process is
patentable if it produces a 'useful, concrete and tangible result'. . . this
Court has never made such a statement and, if taken literally, the
86. 450 U.S. at 211 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
87. Id. at 215.
88. 149 F.3d 1368, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1093 (1999).
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 1373.
92. Id.; see In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (en banc); Arrhythmia
Research Technology Inc. v. Corazonix Corp., 958 F.2d 1053 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
93. Id. (citing In re Alappat, 33 F.3d at 1544) (emphasis added)
94. Lab. Corp., 548 U.S. at 136 (Breyer, J., dissenting); see Brief for Respondents,
Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., Inc., 2006 WL 303905, at *36-38.
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statement would cover instances where this Court has held the
contrary."" Therefore, Breyer's dissent in Lab. Corp. left patentees
uncertain about not only the validity of correlative diagnostic patents,
but also unsure of the continuing validity of the Federal Circuit's
holding in State Street. The stage for the next battle was set in motion
when a gas utility employee from Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania named
Bernard Bilski filed an application with the PTO in April of 1997.
B. In re Bilski: the Federal Circuit Decides to 'Put Up or Shut Up'
Bilski's patent application claimed a method for hedging risks in
the trading of various commodities. Essentially, the method
consisted of (1) initiating a series of sales between a broker and a
purchaser where the purchaser buys the commodity at a fixed rate
based on historical prices, (2) identifying the sellers or producers of
the commodity, and (3) initiating a series of sales between the broker
and the sellers/producers of the commodity at another fixed rate, so
that the seller's and purchaser's respective risk balance one another."
In Bilski, the applicant was appealing a previous Board of Patent
Appeals and Interferences decision rejecting the application as
outside the scope of patentable subject matter under 35 U.S.C. §
101.i Following initial oral arguments but before final disposition of
the case, the Federal Circuit, sua sponte, ordered en banc review and
new oral arguments were heard on May 8, 2008.'0
The court began by characterizing Bilski's claims as to a
"process" and then defining a patentable "process" to exclude all
95. Lab. Corp., 548 U.S. at 136 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
96. U.S. Patent Application 08/833,892 (filed Apr. 10, 1997), reprinted in Petition for
Writ of Certiorari app. at 10, Bilski v. Doll, 129 S. Ct. 2735 (U.S. Jan. 28, 2009) (No. 08-
964), available at http://www.abanet.org/publiced/preview/briefs/pdfs/07-08/08-
964_Petitioner.pdf.
97. In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 949 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc).
98. U.S. Patent Application 08/833,892; Claim 1: A method for managing the
consumption risk costs of a commodity sold by a commodity provider at a fixed price
comprising the steps of: (a) initiating a series of transactions between said commodity
provider and consumers of said commodity wherein said consumers purchase said
commodity at a fixed rate based upon historical averages, said fixed rate corresponding to
a risk position of said consumer; (b) identifying market participants for said commodity
having a counter-risk position to said consumers; and (c) initiating a series of transactions
between said commodity provider and said market participants at a second fixed rate such
that said series of market participant transactions balances the risk position of said series
of consumer transactions.
99. Ex parte Bilski, Appeal No. 2002-2257, 2006 Pat. App. LEXIS 51, (B.P.A.I.
2006).
100. In re Bilski, 545 F.3d at 949.
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"laws of nature, natural phenomena, [or] abstract ideas."")' Next, the
majority portrayed the "true issue[s]" in the case as whether or not
Bilski sought "to claim a fundamental principle (such as an abstract
idea) or a mental process" and to identify what test courts should use
to differentiate between fundamental principles and patentable
processes under 35 U.S.C. § 101.102 In defining the nature of the test,
the court looked back to the principles elucidated by the Supreme
Court in Gottschalk, Flook, and Diehr, and concluded the Machine or
Transformation Test had always been the threshold inquiry for the
determination of patentable subject matter: "A claimed process is
surely patent-eligible under § 101 if: (1) it is tied to a particular
machine or apparatus, or (2) it transforms a particular article into a
different state or thing."o) In doing so, the Federal Circuit
proclaimed the Machine or Transformation Test to be the sole test for
patentability of processes under § 101 and disavowed any other
measuring stick for these types of claims.104 The court determined the
claimed process at issue in Gottschalk was not, in fact, limited to
computers (a machine) because the claimed algorithm was only useful
in the context of computers and thus the applicant sought to preempt
all uses of that algorithm (a fundamental principle)."os Similarly, in
Flook, the majority characterized the alarm limit calculation claim as
unpatentable because it was neither tied to an apparatus or machine
nor did it transform any matter from one state to another."" Finally,
the court differentiated Diehr as passing both requirements of the
Machine or Transformation Test as the claimed process at issue in
that case was (1) tied to the rubber curing machine and (2) resulted in
the transformation of rubber from an uncured to a cured state."
In affirming the primacy of the Machine or Transformation Test,
the court had to deal with its earlier opinions in State Street and
101. Bilski, 545 F.3d at 952 (quoting Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 185 (1981) (citing
Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 589 (1978); Gottshalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972)); see
id. at n.5, wherein the court defines "fundamental principles" to mean "laws of nature,
natural phenomena, and abstract ideas"; Note also the Federal Circuit's strong reliance on
the definitions of "processes" as provided by Diehr, 450 U.S. at 185, Flook, 437 U.S. at
589, and Gottshalk, 409 U.S. at 67.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 954.
104. Id. at 956.
105. Id. at 955; see also id. at n.9 (discussing the Bilski court's interpretation of the
claim at issue in Gottschalk).
106. Bilski, 545 F.3d at 955; see also id. at n.8 (discussing the Bilski court's
interpretation of the claim at issue in Flook).
107. Id. at 954.
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Alappat. The en banc panel noted that while "a process tied to a
particular machine, or transforming or reducing a particular article
into a different state or thing, will generally produce a 'concrete' and
'tangible' result . .. that inquiry is insufficient to determine whether a
claim is patent-eligible under § 101."""' However, while certainly
gutting the underlying rationale of the State Street decision, the Bilski
court refused to completely overrule it and intimated that a business
method may still be patentable subject matter if it conforms to the
Machine or Transformation Test. This decision drew a vehement
dissent from Judge Mayer who characterized State Street as having
"led us down the wrong path" in approving the patentability of any
business method at all." Turning to the merits, the court determined
in a 9-3 ruling that, while arguably useful, Bilski's claimed method
was neither tied to a machine nor resulted in the transformation of
matter from one state to another and hence was unpatentable subject
matter under the Machine or Transformation Test." Specifically, the
majority noted:
"[T]he process as claimed encompasses the exchange of only
options, which are simply legal rights to purchase some
commodity at a given price in a given time period. The claim
only refers to "transactions" involving the exchange of these
legal rights at a "fixed rate corresponding to a risk position."
Thus, claim 1 does not involve the transformation of any
physical object or substance, or an electronic signal
representative of any physical object or substance. Given its
admitted failure to meet the machine implementation part of
the test as well, the claim entirely fails the machine-or-
transformation test and is not drawn to patent-eligible subject
matter.".
Following the en banc court's rejection of his application, Bilski
petitioned the Supreme Court, which granted certiorari on June 1,
2009.112
108. Bilski, 545 F.3d at 959.
109. Id. at 1001 (Mayer J., dissenting).
110. Id. at 963-64.
111. Id. at 964.
112. Bilski v. Doll, 129 S. Ct. 2735 (U.S. Jun. 1, 2009) (No. 08-964) (mem.).); the case
was argued before the Supreme Court on Nov. 9, 2009 and renamed Bilski v. Kappos after
David Kappos was appointed head of the PTO by President Obama (transcript available
at http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral-arguments/argument-transcripts/08-964.pdf (last
visitied May 8, 2010).
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It is important to put the Federal Circuit's decision in Bilski into
context. Over the past few years, in several high profile cases, the
Supreme Court made a habit of repudiating the Federal Circuit's
patent jurisprudence as straying too far from Supreme Court
precedent. This was vividly demonstrated in decisions such as eBay
Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., where a unanimous Supreme Court
determined the Federal Circuit's practice of automatically issuing an
injunction following a finding of patent infringement was not in
conformity with the Court's traditional four-factor test.
Additionally, in KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., the Court unanimously
ruled the Federal Circuit was applying its Teaching, Suggestion, and
Motivation Test for the determination of obviousness under 35 U.S.C.
§103 too rigidly based on the Court's prior decisions.114 An
appreciation of this context places the majority's close reliance on the
rationale of Gottschalk, Flook, and Diehr in declaring the Machine or
Transformation Test to be the sole threshold inquiry under §101 into
perspective. Additionally, Justice Breyer's thinly veiled criticism of
State Street's "useful, concrete, or tangible result" language in Lab.
Corp. may have helped push the majority to disavowal adherence to
that principle in determining patentable subject matter for
processes." In fact, the Bilski majority opinion specifically mentions
Lab. Corp. and characterizes the claim in that case as "similar" to
Bilski's in that both "claim a non-transformative process that
encompasses a purely mental process of performing requisite
mathematical calculations without the aid of a computer or any other
device.""' If the Supreme Court affirms the Federal Circuit's decision
in Bilski, it will signal a seismic shift in the types of patents the PTO
will grant while simultaneously calling into question the validity of
hundreds of business method, medical diagnostic, and personalized
medicine patents.
C. How Are Medical Diagnostic Method Patent Claims Currently
Written?
As discussed, supra, restriction of patentable processes to subject
matter conforming to the Bilski Court's Machine or Transformation
Test may particularly impact diagnostic and personalized medicine
113. 547 U.S. 388, 390 (2006).
114. 550 U.S. 398, 415 (2007).
115. Lab. Corp., 548 U.S. at 136 (Breyer J., dissenting); see supra note 96.
116. Bilski, 545 F.3d at 965; see also id. at n.27.
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method patents. While it is possible the Supreme Court will limit the
reach of Bilski and restrict it to business methods, it seems just as
likely that processes neither tied to a machine nor able to change
matter from one physical state to another will survive a broad general
affirmation. The likelihood that these types of method patents will be
declared invalid is particularly probable given that both the majority
en banc Federal Circuit and Justice Breyer in his Lab. Corp. dissent
seem to have serious reservations about the continued validity of
methods like Metabolite's claim 13 for detecting B12 and folate
deficiencies.' Given this prospect, an analysis of issued diagnostic
and personalized medicine method patents was conducted in order to
get a general idea of the scope and nature of the effect that an
affirmation of Bilski might have as well as to give patent agents and
attorneys a better understanding as to how these types of claims are
currently written.""
Clear patterns emerge in the construction of claims written for
diagnostic and personalized medicine. All issued patents fell into one
of four categories. The first category (I), was termed "Lab. Corp.
claims" due to similarity to claim 13 at issue in Lab. Corp v.
Metabolite, Inc.. Essentially, these claims (1) test or assay a
biomarker in a fluid or a tissue via a method that is well known in the
art and then (2) correlate the results of that test/assay with a known
standard to diagnose the pathology in question. Among the claims
examined, 53% fell into this classification.n' The second category (II)
117. See supra notes 116-17.
118. The Delphion database was searched for issued patents using the keyword
"biomarker" in the title and claim fields and "diagnose* or prognos*" in the claim field.
After refining the initial search results to include only those patents relating to diagnostic
and personalized medicine methods, a group of 32 issued patents was analyzed and is the
subject of the summary infra. Note that the analyzed patent claims were not separated by
patent families and the group may therefore include more than one patent from a given
family depending on the wording of the claim. Nevertheless, multiple patents from the
same families were included in the analysis due to the fact that each passed through
prosecution and was allowed to issue by the PTO. Ordinals have been inserted into the
representative claims, infra, where absent to provide for ease of reading.
119. See, e.g., Prediction of Prostate Cancer Progression by Analysis of Selected
Predictive Parameters, U.S. Patent No. 6,025,128 (filed Sep. 29, 1994) (issued Feb. 15,
2000); Claim 1: A method of predicting prostate cancer progression, comprising: (a)
obtaining prostate cells from a subject; (b) analyzing predictive parameters in the prostate
cells, wherein the predictive parameters are nuclear morphometric descriptors, including:
object sum optical density, picograms of DNA, contrast, correlation, sum average, sum
variance, difference variance, difference entropy, information measure B, product
moment, standard deviation, and DNA ploidy; and c) predicting cancer progression by
statistical analysis of the predictive parameters, where the statistical analysis is logistic
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of diagnostic and personalized medicine claims, called "biomarker
identification," included methods where an assay identifies a
particular biomarker in a sample. The mere presence of the
biomarker is indicative of disease. Among the claims examined, 23%
fell into this classification.1 2 The third category (III) had two
independent claims in each instance. (1) The first claimed a
computer-based system that a user trained to diagnose a disease state
by inputting reference values for one or more biomarkers from a test
population having subpopulations known to suffer from the
diseases(s) in question. (2) A second independent claim was directed
towards the method of using the system from the first independent
claim to diagnose the disease. Of the claims examined, 15% fell into
this category. 121 Finally, the remaining 7% of these patent claims (IV)
did not cleanly fall into any of the above three categories.
regression, discriminate analysis, recursive partitioning, neural network, or classification
and regression tree analysis.
120. See, e.g., Detection of Novel Carbohydrates Directly Associated with Chronic
Alcoholism, U.S. Patent No. 5,747,346 (filed May 27, 1994) (issued May 5, 1998); Claim 31:
A rapid and simple spot test method for diagnosing chronic alcoholism by detecting ethyl
glucuronide, a biomarker whose presence in a fluid sample is specifically associated with
chronic alcoholism, comprising the steps of: (a) obtaining a pre-determined volume of a
sample from an individual being tested for the presence of ethyl glucuronide indicative of
chronic alcohol consumption, wherein the sample is obtained at least 7 days after the
individual has terminated alcohol consumption; (b) spotting the sample onto an absorbent
substrate; (c) reacting the sample with a reagent comprising diphenylamine, aniline, and
phosphoric acid or DAP reagent; and
(d) observing if there is a colorimetric reaction in the localized area of the spot, with the
colorimetric reaction indicating the presence of alcohol-specific ethyl glucuronide in the
sample, wherein the presence of ethyl glucuronide is diagnostic of chronic alcoholism;
Claim 35: The method of claim 31, wherein in step (a) a pre-determined volume of a fluid
sample from an individual who is a non-alcoholic and non-diabetic, and a pre-determined
volume of a fluid sample containing ethyl glucuronide are provided as control samples,
and further comprising the steps of: (e) spectrophotometrically measuring the amount of
color observed in the localized spots of the test and control samples after (c); (f)
comparing the spectrophotometric measurements to determine if the test sample contains
the ethyl glucuronide.
121. See, e.g., Computer Assisted Methods for Diagnosing Diseases, U.S. Patent No.
5,769,074 (filed May 3, 1996) (issued Jun. 23, 1998); Claim 1: A method for training a
computer-based neural network to be used in diagnosing or prognosing disease in a
patient comprising: preprocessing patient biomarkers, comprising: (a) selecting patient
biomarkers associated with a disease process; (b) statistically and/or computationally
testing discriminating power for indicating presence or absence of the disease of the
selected patient biomarkers individually in linear and/or non-linear combination; (c)
applying statistical, mathematical, or computational tools, and/or expert knowledge for the
derivation of secondary input to the neural network that are linear or non-linear
combinations of the original or transformed biomarkers; (d) selecting only those patient
biomarkers or derived secondary inputs that show discriminating power; and (e) training
the computer-based neural network using the preprocessed patient biomarkers or derived
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D. Summary of the Current Patentability of Diagnostic and
Personalized Medicine Method Claims
Evident from the analysis, supra, is the high percentage of claims
(75%) appearing to fail the Machine or Transformation Test
elucidated in Bilski. They all claim the measurement of biological
samples via generalized and non-patented assays and biological
techniques. Additionally, all of the claims in categories I and II
appear to simply correlate the results of the measurement step with
either a diagnostic standard (I) or the presence or absence of the
biomarker itself (II) to determine the presence or absence of disease.
None of the generalized claims of categories I or II appear to require
the presence or operation of a machine or apparatus or result in the
transformation of matter from one state to another. Rather, all of the
claims in these two categories appear to claim a natural principle: the
fact that certain biomarkers in human physiology either tend to
modulate relative to known standards (I) or tend to disappear or
appear in response to certain pathologies (II). These facts of nature
have always existed independent of their later discoveries by
scientists. These relationships are not "anything under the sun made
by man" and it is difficult to see how they would fall into a
classification of patentable subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101 if
Bilski is affirmed. 122
On the other hand, those diagnostic claims utilizing the form of
category III seem to require a machine for their function. Teaching a
computer to recognize diagnostic markers in populations and then
using that computer to recognize the probability of disease in
individuals because of that teaching arguably conforms to the
Machine or Transformation Test. Such diagnostic method claims may
well survive a broad Supreme Court affirmation of Bilski. Given this
probability, it may be in the interest of patent agents and attorneys to
try to incorporate such computer-based methods into at least one of
their patent claims for diagnostic and personalized medicine methods
so as to meet the requirements of §101 as interpreted by the Machine
or Transformation Test.
secondary inputs; Claim 2: A method for diagnosing or prognosing a disease in a patient,
comprising: (a) introducing patient biomarkers into the trained computer-based neural
network of claim 1; (b) receiving an output value from the computer-based neural network
corresponding to the presence or the absence or the severity of the disease; and (c)
transmitting the output value from the computer-based neural network to an output value
receiver connected to a display means.
122. See supra note 13.
10 - SHow -A DREADFUL PROGNOSIS - 051310 AM.DOC (Do NOT DELETE) 5/14/2010 9:41:16 AM
SUMMER 2010] A DREADFUL PROGNOSIS 323
Some argue, in spite of the historical development of 35 U.S.C. §
101 and the reluctance to grant patents covering natural principles,
judicial interpretation can successfully bend § 101's language to
accommodate medical diagnostic and personalized medicine
methods. A proponent of this is Judge Rader of the Federal Circuit,
who in his Bilski dissent criticized both Breyer's "oft-discussed"
dissent in Lab. Corp. and the Bilski majority's reliance upon it by
noting:
"[t]he fundamental error in that Lab Corp. dissent is its failure
to recognize the difference between a patent ineligible
relationship-i.e., that between high homocysteine levels and
folate and cobalamin [vitamin B12] deficiencies-and a patent
eligible process for applying that relationship to achieve a
useful, tangible, and concrete result-i.e., diagnosis of
potentially fatal conditions in patients. Nothing abstract here.
Moreover, testing blood for a dangerous condition is not a
natural phenomenon, but a human invention. The distinction is
simple but critical: A patient may suffer from the unpatentable
phenomenon of nature, namely high homocysteine levels and
low folate. But the invention does not attempt to claim that
natural phenomenon. Instead the patent claims a process for
assaying a patient's blood and then analyzing the results with a
new process that detects the life-threatening condition.
Moreover, the sick patient does not practice the patented
invention. Instead the patent covers a process for testing blood
that produces a useful, concrete, and tangible result:
incontrovertible diagnostic evidence to save lives."
With all due respect to Judge Rader, it is he who commits a
"fundamental error," not for the incorrect recognition of "the
difference between a patent ineligible relationship ... and a patent
eligible process for applying that relationship" but for failing to
recognize that, in the method at issue in Lab. Corp., the patent
ineligible relationship was one in the same with the process for
applying that relationship.124 The previously utilized example of
Einstein's Theory of Relativity is instructive. The fact that energy (E)
is equal to the mass of an object (in) times the speed of light (c)
squared is a natural principle of physics, a fundamental law of nature
that has always existed. The fact that serum homocysteine levels
increase with Vitamin B12 and folate deficiencies is a natural
123. Bilski, 545 F.3d at 1014 (Rader J., dissenting).
124. Id.
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principle of physiology, a fundamental law of human metabolism that
has existed probably from the time humans evolved into omnivores.
While it is true that "testing blood for a dangerous condition is not a
natural phenomenon, but a human invention," so too is it true that
weighing an object to determine its mass (as in the "m" in E = mc2) is
not a natural phenomenon, but a human invention. 12' The problem
with Rader's logic is that, in performing the "process for assaying a
patient's blood and then analyzing the results with a new process that
detects the life-threatening condition" a user simply applies the law of
nature to a specific circumstance (i.e. that of the individual being
tested).126 Einstein's theory does not become a patentable method
simply because I claim use of the relationship by measuring the mass
of a chair any more than if I perform it measuring the mass of an
atom of hydrogen. In both cases I am simply restating the general
natural principle but have substituted the mass of a real-world "thing"
in the place of the variable "m." So too in Lab. Corp., analyzing a
patient's blood by a non-patentable technique (like weighing the mass
of something in the Einstein example) and then plugging that variable
into the equation (high serum homocysteine = vitamin deficiency) is
merely use of the natural principle to illustrate the natural principle.
They are one in the same.
This fact illustrates why the majority abandoned the "useful,
concrete, and tangible result" language of State Street.12 It was far too
broad to keep natural principles out of patentable subject matter. As
discussed infra, while there may be compelling public policy reasons
to permit patents on these types of method claims, the static and
relatively unchanging nature of the language of § 101 and
interpretation of it by the courts, for better or for worse, simply will
not permit this subject matter to pass the first hurdle for patentability.
IV. Should Diagnostic and Personalized Medicine Methods be
Patentable Subject Matter?
As discussed, it is difficult to argue the statutory language and
historical judicial interpretation of 35 U.S.C. § 101 permit the
patenting of personalized medicine and general medical diagnostic
method claims. Nevertheless, it is the purpose of this Note to argue
granting these types of patents is not only in the public interest but
125. Bilski, 545 F.3d at 1014 (Rader J., dissenting).
126. Id.
127. See supra notes 112 and 119.
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critical for the advancement of medical science. Judge Rader, while
not convincing in his argument that the language of § 101 permits
patenting of medical diagnostics like the one in Lab. Corp., supra,
nevertheless fully grasps the public policy implications of that lack of
protection in his Bilski dissent. Rader accuses both the Bilski
majority and Justice Breyer's Lab. Corp. dissent of "avoid[ing] the
same fundamental question ... : Is this entire field of subject matter
undeserving of incentives for invention? If so, why?" 128 Judge Radar
concisely notes that without the incentive of patent protection, the
diagnostic test at issue in Lab. Corp. might still be unknown and
people who develop vitamin B12 and folate deficiencies might still be
subject to potentially life threatening medical conditions.129 From a
policy perspective, therefore, the problem with the Bilski majority
and the dissent in Lab. Corp. is that if interpreted broadly they leave
such critical medical advances unprotected and disincentivized
"precisely because of [their] elegance and simplicity (the chief aims of
all good science)." 10 This development threatens to inadvertently
direct investor money away from the discovery of basic scientific
relationships, like that of homocysteine relative to B12 deficiencies,
that have a tangible and real impact on the lives of the public for
earlier, cheaper, and more efficient diagnosis of "breast cancer or Lou
Gehrig's disease or Parkinson's or whatever."'3 It is the antithesis of
the Constitutional mandate "[t]o promote the progress of science and
useful arts." 132
Similarly, in her dissent from the majority decision in Bilski,
Judge Newman notes "the full reach of today's change of law is not
clear ... Uncertainty is the enemy of innovation. These new
uncertainties not only diminish the incentives available to new
enterprise, but disrupt the settled expectations of those who relied on
the law as it existed." 13 Newman further characterized the majority's
ruling as "backward-looking" and a threat to the development of the
economically critical, "rapidly moving[,] and commercially vibrant
fields of the Information Age."1 4 It is this threat to innovation, not
just for the computer/software sector but also for the development of




132. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; see supra note 3.
133. Bilski, 545 F.3d at 977 (Newman J., dissenting).
134. Id. at 992-93 (Newman J., dissenting)
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new diagnostic and personalized medicine, which should be making
policy experts and lawmakers nervous, not just for economic impact
but for public health as well. The medical story of the early twentieth
century was the essential eradication and prevention of
communicable and, for the most part, early childhood diseases like
polio, smallpox, measles, mumps, rubella, and tuberculosis. This had
a huge effect on both human life expectancy and infant mortality in
the United States and throughout the industrialized world."' Since
more Americans are living longer relative to a century ago, it is now
even more critical to develop quick, inexpensive, and basic diagnostic
tools to catch conditions like cancer, heart disease, and diabetes early
and at a stage where mortality rates are low with rapid and effective
treatment. This absolutely vital need will be stymied and delayed
without the full weight of the patent system behind it. Unfortunately,
Bilski threatens to serve as an obstacle to this public health necessity,
and either the Court or the Congress should prevent this from
happening.
Some argue granting patents to these types of natural
relationships will impede rather than encourage the development of
new medical diagnostics and require patients to pay more to get the
newest cutting edge diagnoses. For these individuals, no one should
be forced to pay a licensing fee to find out whether or not they have a
disease. The ACLU recently adopted this view and is currently
participating in a lawsuit in the Southern District of New York to
invalidate Myriad Genetic's patented test for genetic susceptibility to
breast cancer via inherited mutations in the human BRCA1 and
BRCA2 genes.' 6  Additionally, these critics argue that granting
patents on diagnostics such as the one in Lab. Corp. or Myriad's
breast cancer test inhibits the developments of new technologies that
will improve on the original tests.
Aside from the ACLU's unsubstantiated accusation that
companies like Myriad are "patent[ing] DNA," these arguments do
not stand up under legal or public policy analysis.1' First, while it is
135. Dep't of Health & Human Services, Nat'l Ctr for Health Statistics; Nat'1 Vital
Statistics Reports, vol. 54, no. 19, June 28, 2006.
136. John Schwartz, Cancer Patients Sue Testing Company and Government Over Gene
Patents, N.Y. TIMES, May 13, 2009, at A20.
137. Id.; A plaintiff in the case, Jan A. Nowak, president of the Association for
Molecular Pathology declares "[y]ou can't patent my DNA, any more than you can patent
my right arm, or patent my blood." However, Myriad has not patented anyone's DNA.
Nor has Myriad "patented a gene." What Myriad has done, at great expense, is isolate
and purify a human DNA sequence that represents a higher than normal probability for
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true those wishing to use Metabolite or Myriad's test must pay a
license fee for the right to do so, critics tend to overlook the fact that
this is the point of the patent system. The Constitution clearly says
the goal is to encourage progress in the sciences by securing for
inventors "for limited times" the exclusive rights to their inventions.1"
The operative word here is "limited." Metabolite and Myriad's
patents are not going to last forever. When they expire, anyone will
be able to use the method as cheaply as possible. What critics like the
ACLU and the Association for Molecular Pathology miss is the fact
that without the incentive of a patent, we might not currently have
any way to easily diagnosis vitamin B12 and folate deficiencies or
predict the likelihood of developing breast and ovarian cancer.
Critics should keep in mind that Myriad and the inventors of the test
at issue in Lab. Corp. spent millions developing their diagnostic tools.
It is unreasonable to suggest that they should be deprived of their
ability to recoup that investment through a temporally-limited and
constitutionally-mandated mechanism simply because the subject
matter of the patent is a relationship between biological factors and a
disease state. Certainly, no one would suggest that a method to
diagnose cancer utilizing a new type of ultrasound machine is
unpatentable subject matter because it involves identifying a
biological factor (a tumor) and comparing its presence to the
existence or absence of a disease state (cancer). Why is one
patentable and the other not merely because the ultrasound example
conforms to some arbitrary "Machine or Transformation Test?"
Second, the notion that granting patents on these types of
relationships impedes the improvement of these methods naively
assumes that the diagnostic relationships at issue are the only way to
achieve the diagnosis. Perhaps some other blood factor, besides
homocysteine, indicates the presence of vitamin B12 or folate
deficiency. Perhaps another DNA sequence or other biomarker,
other than inherited mutations in BRCA 1 or 2, indicate a higher
probability of developing breast cancer. Patents on these
relationships will not impede but rather encourage the development
of new and better diagnostic and personalized medical tests as
developing breast or ovarian cancer when present in a human being. In doing so, human
DNA was combined with DNA from microorganisms such as bacteria to create a molecule
that does not exist in nature and is completely the work of human hands. No one can
"patent a gene" because a gene is a theoretical concept that represents how a sequence of
DNA behaves in a certain cellular context. Saying Myriad has "patented a gene" is akin
to saying that someone has "patented the Saint Bernard" or "the llama."
138. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (emphasis added); see supra note 3.
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inventors attempt to design around already patented methods. It is
similar to assuming that the only way to improve transportation at the
end of the nineteenth century was to make improvements on the
steam engine while completely discounting the possibility that
something like the internal combustion engine might be "out there."
Therefore, what follows are a couple of suggestions to ensure these
types of medical methods remain patentable subject matter.
A. The Supreme Court Should Limit the Reach of the Bilski 'Machine
or Transformation Test' to Restrict Only Business Method
Patentability
In the Patent and Copyright Clause of the Constitution, the
Framers resolved that the goal of the U.S. patent system should be
towards the "promot[ion of] the progress of science and the useful
arts.""' From the time of the late 18th Century and the writing of the
Constitution, the term "useful arts" has evolved into what we now
commonly refer to as "technology.",141 In his dissenting opinion in
Bilski, Judge Mayer notes that "by mandating that patents advance
the useful arts, "[t]he Constitution explicitly limited patentability
to . . . 'the process today called technological innovation."' 141 Further,
"the Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized what renders subject
matter patentable is 'the application of the law of nature to a new and
useful end."' 42 Mayer further argues "[m]ethods of doing business do
not apply 'the law of nature to a new and useful end.' Because the
innovative aspect of such methods is an entrepreneurial rather than a
technological one, they should be deemed ineligible for patent
protection."143 Consequently, Judge Mayer believes methods directed
to social sciences such as economics, business, sociology, and
psychology should be barred from patentability while at the same
time new ways to apply natural principles should be granted patent
protection.
The Supreme Court should follow the reasoning of Judge Mayer
and affirm the Machine or Transformation Test in Bilski only to the
139. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; see supra note 3.
140. Karl B. Lutz, Patents and Science: A Clarification of the Patent Clause of the U.S.
Constitution, 18 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 50, 54 (1949) ("The term 'useful arts' as used in the
Constitution ... is best represented in modern language by the word 'technology."').
141. Bilski, 545 F.3d at 1001 (Mayer J., dissenting) (citing In re Comiskey, 499 F.3d
1365, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2007)).
142. Id. at 1003 (Mayer J., dissenting) (citing Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant
Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130 (1948)).
143. Id.; see also id. at note 6.
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extent that it renders business methods and other patents directed to
the social sciences ineligible subject matter under 35 U.S.C § 101. A
broad affirmation of the test with applicability to all method claims
will not only throw the medical diagnostic and personalized medicine
industries into chaos, but will reach into other areas vital to the
economy as well, such as software and other computer-related
technologies. Investors have relied on the patentability of these
technologies and many small biotechnology companies could be
wiped out overnight with an opinion that puts their main assets, i.e.
their intellectual property, at risk for invalidity. Unlike Justice
Breyer's dissent in Lab. Corp. and the majority en banc opinion in
Bilski, the Supreme Court should carefully consider just how an
affirmation of Bilski will effect what is essentially the last vibrant
sector of the already troubled American economy and limit its reach
accordingly.
A recent case decided by the Federal Circuit, Prometheus
Laboratories, Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative Services, seems to show the
Federal Circuit wrestling with the Machine or Transformation Test in
the context of medical diagnostic and personalized medicine
patents.144 In Prometheus, one of the claims at issue was for a method
of determining drug metabolite concentrations in a patient following
drug administration and using that data to adjust drug dosage to
optimize efficacy and evade toxic side effects.14 One thing readily
apparent about claim 1 in Prometheus is its similarity to Metabolite's
claim 13 in Lab. Corp. Both claims involve (1) determining the
quantity of a single chemical in a bodily fluid and (2) using
information about that chemical to deduce information about a
different chemical in the bodily fluid.146  In a decision no doubt
bringing joy to nervous diagnostic biotechnology companies in the
wake of Bilski, the Federal Circuit found that both the "administering
the drug" and "determining the level" steps of the claimed method
144. 581 F.3d 1336 (Fed Cir 2009).
145. Id. at 1339-40; U.S. Patent No. 6,355,623 (filed March 12, 2002). Claim 1: A
method of optimizing therapeutic efficacy for treatment of an immune-mediated
gastrointestinal disorder, comprising: (a) administering a drug providing 6-thioguanine to
a subject having said immune-mediated gastrointestinal disorder; and (b) determining the
level of 6-thioguanine in said subject having said immune-mediated gastrointestinal
disorder, wherein the level of 6-thioguanine less than about 230 pmol per 8x108 red blood
cells indicates a need to increase the amount of said drug subsequently administered to
said subject and wherein the level of 6-thioguanine greater than about 400 pmol per 8x108
red blood cells indicates a need to decrease the amount of said drug subsequently
administered to said subject.
146. Id.; supra notes 47 and 146.
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passed Machine or Transformation Test muster. 1 The result of
Prometheus, therefore, seems to indicate the Federal Circuit's
willingness to separate out business method claims from personalized
medicine/diagnostic claims and give the latter their figurative stamp
of approval in line with Judge Mayer's dissent in Bilski.148 However,
in spite of this apparent good news for the biotech industry, several
important questions remain. Will the Supreme Court recognize the
distinction between business methods and medical diagnostic patents
that the Federal Circuit seems to see in the claims at issue in Bilski
and Prometheus? Alternatively, will the Court broadly affirm the
Machine or Transformation Test, subsequently leaving little room for
diagnostic and personalized medicine claims? How will the full Court
address Justice Breyer's dissent in Lab. Corp.? Given Justice
Souter's recent retirement and the question mark that new Justice
Sotomayor represents when it comes to patent issues, will Breyer's
reasoning hold sway or will the conservatives on the Court rule
differently? Finally, even if Bilski is affirmed, will the Supreme Court
nevertheless grant certiorari in Prometheus so that it can decide the
issue of diagnostic/personalized medicine patents directly and once
and for all?
B. Congress Should Consider Creating a New Statutory Classification
for the Protection of Diagnostic and Personalized Medicine Patents
The Supreme Court emphasizes lower courts "must proceed
cautiously when ... asked to extend patent rights into areas wholly
unforeseen by Congress." 149  As detailed, supra, the words of the
Patent Act, with regard to patentable subject matter, are essentially
identical to the words approved by Congress in 1790.'o Therefore, it
is safe to assume that the first Congress did not "foresee" the
importance of medical diagnostic and personalized medicine methods
given the primitive state of medical knowledge at the time. Given
this fact, Congress should amend the Patent Act to protect these
important types of methods and to encourage individuals to pursue
discovery of diagnostic relationships. Alternatively, Congress could
create a separate classification of patent for diagnostic and
personalized medicine. Such a move would not be unprecedented.
147. Id. at 1349-50.
148. Supra notes 142-44.
149. Flook, 437 U.S. at 596.
150. See supra notes 14, 17, 19-20.
151. See supra notes 22-24.
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Prior to 1930, it was generally believed that plants were patent-
ineligible subject matter because they were living things. 2  When
Congress passed the Townsend-Purnell Plant Patent Act in 1930, the
United States became the first country to provide patent protection
for plants.'? The Constitution gives Congress sweeping authority to
define patentable subject matter. It is in the public interest to
encourage these types of patents to improve the health and lives of
the citizenry.
A new patent regime for diagnostic and personalized medicine
could also help relieve some of the fears of those opposed to granting
property rights in these types of discoveries. The new system could
limit the time-period of the patent grant, making it shorter than the
20 years given utility patents as is the case with the 14-year period
granted for design patents.154 Additionally, rather than starting the
patent grant clock ticking on the date of application, this new regime
could defer this until after a regulatory agency, such as the FDA,
approves the diagnostic or personalized medical procedure for human
use. Therefore, investors in these types of technologies will know
exactly how long they have to recoup their investments, even if this is
a shorter period than a regular utility grant. A system such as this
would maintain innovation and investment into these types of life-
saving technologies as well as facilitate faster movement into the
public domain.
V. Conclusion
Medical diagnostic and personalized medicine patents have a
long and contentious history in the PTO and with the courts. Thomas
Jefferson's original Patent Act language survives today essentially
unchanged from the time he penned it almost two and a quarter
centuries ago. This text and the manner courts have interpreted it
throughout the centuries seem to leave little room for the
patentability of these technologies under 35 U.S.C. § 101. This is
especially true in the wake of the Federal Circuit's en banc decision in
In re Bilski and Justice Breyer's dissent in Lab. Corp. How the
Supreme Court will rule in Bilski is anybody's guess. However, if the
Court decides to affirm, it should carefully distinguish the
152. Max Stul Oppenheimer, The "Reasonable Plant" Test: When Progress Outruns the
Constitution. 9 MINN. J.L. SC. & TECH. 417, 417 (2008).
153. Townsend-Purnell Plant Patent Act, ch. 312, § 1, 46 Stat. 376 (1930) (codified as
amended at 35 U.S.C. § 161 (2000)).
154. 35 U.S.C. § 173 (2000).
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patentability of diagnostic and personalized medicine patents of the
type at issue in Lab. Corp. and Prometheus from the business
methods at issue in Bilski and State Street Bank. Alternatively,
Congress should entertain extending special protection to these types
of patents, as their continued existence is critical for the economy,
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